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Introduction: Background and Context 
 
Fragmentation is a ‘dirty word’ in the construction sectors.  It has been employed extensively 
in reports as a causal explanation of many of the ills of the industry, most of which relate to, 
alleged, poor performance (Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998; Construction Industry Review 
Committee, 2001).  Fragmentation is defined as “A breaking or separation into fragments’ 
where a fragment is ‘a (comparatively) small detached portion of anything; A detached, 
isolated, or incomplete part; a (comparatively) small portion of anything” (OED, 2010).  Such 
use of ‘fragmentation’ intentionally carries negative connotations; however, that is not 
necessarily the reality.  By changing the word but maintaining the extant industrial structure, 
terms such as ‘differentiated’ or ‘specialist’ could be employed, each specialism constituting 
an important fragment; indeed, Adam Smith (Smith, 1789/1970) was an arch proponent of 
fragmentation in advocating division of labour to enhance productivity, as pursued in 
‘scientific management’ (Taylor, 1911), – a path which construction, and most other sectors 
(including automotive and aerospace), have adopted with great enthusiasm. 
 
Perhaps the nub of the issues lies in the business relationship changes which stem from the 
industrial revolution – the transition from craft guilds’ masters and journeymen trading with 
relatively few, known others to multitudes of transactions amongst persons largely unknown 
to each other.  A direct result is the increase in the use and importance of contracts to govern 
relationships and enforcement of the terms of agreements. 
 
Structurally-based concerns regarding fragmentation are addressed by Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) in their treatise on differentiation and integration.  Given that technologies are 
increasingly complicated and that effectiveness and efficiency considerations prompt 
 
 
commensurate differentiation / division of labour / specialisation, then the organisational / 
managerial imperative shifts to integration for the supply of goods and services to ultimate 
consumers.  Hence, acknowledging and respecting the differentiation and the consequent 
independence of ‘component’ suppliers lie at the core of integrating those suppliers’ 
contributions and securing their commitment to deliver the final output.  Thus, the 
fragmentation criticism is not one relating to industrial structure primarily, but concerns how 
integration operates in the market-social context to provide goods and services to customers – 
organisational and individual behaviour being the core focus; as manifested in both neo-
classical (e.g., Friedman, 1970) and new institutional/transaction cost economics (e.g., Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1985). 
 
Specialisation has caused differentiation and led to increasingly complex project 
organisational structures involving numerous specialist firms with each having its own 
boundary to delineate functional and/or economic activities.  Hence, performance of the 
project organisations, temporary multi-organisations (TMOs) as coalitions (Hobday, 1998), is 
dictated, to a large extent, by how well the boundary activities are planned and managed, and 
how permeable the boundaries are (or become) to allow information flow, knowledge sharing, 
and learning. 
 
The features of engineering construction projects dictate that the degree of separated 
specialisms is very extensive.  The design and construction (realisation) processes often 
require major inputs from various engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, chemical, 
aeronautical, IT, civil, etc.), financial institutions (international and local banks, insurance 
companies, etc.), management organisations, and regulators.  (See Greater Gabbard Wind 
Farm Project, 2011 as an example of the multiplicity of participants in a major engineering 
 
 
construction project TMO.)  Many of those specialisations remain required during the 
operating (and adapting) life of the project and during its final disposal (especially nuclear 
and petro-chemical installations).  Thus, clients really “procure complex performance” 
(Caldwell, Roehrich and Davies, 2009: 178) through technically and managerially complex 
projects. Commonly, projects have inputs across many national borders – thereby enhancing 
the categories of cultural interactions (corporate, professional, national).  Thus, understanding 
how the multiplicity of diverse interfaces may be managed is essential. 
 
Lawrence and Scanlan (2007) review performance on engineering projects and determine 
eight primary causes of poor performance/failures: “...poor initial planning, lack of clear 
objectives and deliverables, lack of understanding of dependencies, inadequate resource 
allocation, poor risk analysis, poor change management, lack of ‘buy-in’ from stakeholders, 
poor understanding of priorities” (p 511).  Of those issues, at least five can be attributed to 
fragmentation amongst project participants.  They determine that much difficulty is due to 
entrenched use of out-dated project planning and management tools and techniques which are 
linear, reductionist, and deterministic and cannot cope with iterative working practices 
(especially design) and the complexities in realising today’s engineering projects.  A further, 
generic issue is inadequate communications between project participants, a problem 
exacerbated by participant diversity and by IT systems (Flyvbjerg, 2009) – which, often, have 
significant incompatibilities.   
 
The expanding diversity of specialisms and the geographical and cultural dispersion of  
engineering project participants add to the problems.  An underpinning current of ‘silo 
mentalities’, in which persons are reluctant to employ new methods, is common (see Hall, 
 
 
1980 for further case studies).  Clearly, there is much scope for greater effectiveness and 
efficiency through improvements in intra- and, perhaps especially, inter-group management. 
 
Thus, the research question is: what are important boundaries and how, and to what extent, 
does boundary management impact on performance of complex engineering construction 
projects? 
 
Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this paper is: to explore boundary management on engineering construction 
projects to address issues of fragmentation and of performance. 
 
The objectives are: to investigate theory and practices of boundary management; to examine 
the ways and extents to which boundary management operates on engineering construction 
projects; and to produce a research agenda for studying further, important aspects of 
boundary management impacting on engineering construction projects. 
 
Methods 
The method of study is critical, exploratory review of theory and literature with particular 
reference to recent developments (potentially) applicable to engineering construction projects.  
The widespread criticism based around ‘fragmentation’ is examined in its major forms (and 
from alternative perspectives) as a precursor to discussion of the natures of boundaries and 
approaches to their management.  Behavioural issues (in the social-technical system) which 
affect the relationships of team boundary spanning activities and team/organisation 
performance are addressed together with  boundary management from the perspective of 
complex organisations to identify implications for complex engineering construction projects 
 
 
(such as projects executed through public private partnerships (PPPs) and other forms of joint 
ventures (JVs)) as well as issues of governance of major engineering construction projects.  
The discussion addresses the current understanding and practices of boundary management 
on projects and a research agenda is proffered for advancing enquiry prior to drawing 
conclusions regarding the aim, objectives and main issues revealed. 
 
Structure of the paper 
This theory and literature review and critical synthesis paper is structured as follows: 
• Introduction: explains the background and context of the work, noting the aim, 
objectives and methods employed. 
• Fragmentation and the concept of team boundary: analyses the nature of 
fragmentation, its dimensions and consequences with attention to types and taxonomy 
of organisational boundaries – including intra- and inter-teams; practices of boundary 
spanning and boundary spanners’ characteristics, and the boundary objects (artifacts) 
which are used by and between communities of knowledge/practice. 
• Complexity and project governance: considers the insights drawn from complexity 
theory on the behaviour of engineering construction project organisations and 
personnel to provide a more dynamic and current view of projects as complex 
adaptive systems; those insights are, then, applied to the important issues of project 
governance and control. 
• Discussion: draws the main emergent aspects together in identifying implications for 
project practices and future potential (including education/training) to yield a 
suggested research agenda. 
• Conclusions: summarises the major outcomes from the study in the light of the aim 
and objectives. 
 
 
 
Fragmentation and the concept of team boundary 
 
Essentially, the life cycles of the great majority of construction projects are replete with 
boundaries which have to be managed.  It is not only the realisation phase of such projects 
which incurs TMOs (the ‘quasi-firm’, Eccles, 1981) but also the occupation and use and the 
disposal phases.  Further, the temporal nature of fragmentation (transient involvements of 
participants in project TMOs and different participants on successive projects) constrains the 
acquisition and passing-on of knowledge between projects and its capturing by permanent 
organisations.  The occupation and use phase (by far the most protracted and financially 
significant for the majority of projects) is, now, widely subject to outsourcing of ‘facility 
management’ activities, usually including transient involvement of specialist subcontractors 
for the work required (both construction and building operating related – e.g., security).  Thus, 
construction projects are executed by varying combinations of permanent and temporary 
organisations, both categories of which exhibit performance which is consequent on the other 
and, for the constituents of the temporary organisations, is interdependent on the other 
members of the TMO (see, e.g., Berggren, Söderlund and Anderson, 2001). 
 
The current issues are encapsulated by Owen and eight further authors (2010: 235) who note 
that “The increased performance requirements and complexity of constructed facilities 
require additional specialists and increase the need for integration skills.  Multi-skilling is 
rare and document-based thinking is prevalent….Appreciation of linkages between work 
products in different functional areas, and the ramifications of this interdependency, is 
limited”. 
 
 
 
Thus, this section explores organisational separation and the natures of boundaries of 
organisations likely to be involved with construction projects, examines managerial issues 
relating to the boundaries, and discusses the consequences of alternative boundary 
management approaches. 
 
Fragmentation  
 
Generally, fragmentation has been regarded as occurring along two dimensions – horizontal 
and vertical.  Horizontal fragmentation concerns the multiplicity of actors (individuals, 
organisations, business units) which carry out functions at, approximately, the same stage of a 
process (e.g., schematic design of a building).  Vertical fragmentation concerns the splitting 
up of a total process into components / stages which are executed by significantly separated 
functional actors (e.g., structural engineering design and reinforcement supply and fix).  
Reports on the construction industry have variously, but consistently, criticised the industry 
for its fragmentation – Egan (1998) regarding horizontal aspects (at the ‘main’ contractor 
level); Higgin and Jessop (1965) regarding vertical fragmentation (that in no other industry is 
production so far removed from design).  The construction industry exhibits extensive 
fragmentation along both dimensions and, especially for major projects, there is increasingly 
likely to be extensive fragmentation of the client/customer also – owners, financiers, 
occupiers, users – plus government agencies and a variety of other stakeholders. 
 
Horizontal fragmentation is common in most industries – the variety of organisations which 
carry out supply functions.  Those organisations differ by type of business unit (but, usually, 
companies – especially, public limited companies – dominate), structure, size, location, and 
scope.  (Of some 195, 000 private contractors in UK in 2009, 124 employed over 600 people 
 
 
each, while over 181, 000 employed fewer than 14 persons each; under 45,000 were ‘main 
trades’, including housebuilding, and details are given of both trade and locational 
distributions – ONS, 2010.)  The Banwell Report (1964) was instrumental in clients of the 
industry (particularly, public sector) moving from open to selective tendering for constructor 
selection in endeavouring to secure bidders more suited to the work involved in a project and, 
hence, both improved performance of project realisations and reduced costs of tendering 
through less unproductive bidding.  Latterly, additional procedures have been incorporated in 
bidding (notably curricula vitae of persons whom the tenderer will use to manage the project 
construction) and consultant or in-house project managers are employed to oversee project 
realisation as the client’s main agent. 
 
Thus, horizontal fragmentation is an industry (structural) phenomenon which must be 
addressed to foster effective and efficient (competitive?) selection of participants for each 
stage (vertical) of a project.  However, on a project, it is vertical fragmentation 
(commissioning client, designers, constructors, etc.) and remaining horizontal elements (e.g., 
subcontractors) where integration (communication, coordination, etc.) through boundary 
management is required.  That project situation is exacerbated by the temporal fragmentation 
in the TMO, and by the spatial fragmentation of participants. 
 
Organisational Boundaries – inter-team and intra-team  
In various guises, a great deal of attention is devoted to overcoming boundaries between 
(sub-)systems, including JVs, PPPs and other forms of alliance between organisations (Sheth 
and Parvatiyar, 1992), bridging and bonding in the context of social capital (Edelman, 
Bresnen, Newell, Scarborough and Swan, 2004), supply chains and (social) networks (Cox, 
1999), and boundary objects (Bresnen, 2010).  Recent perspectives afforded by chaos theory 
 
 
(Stewart, 2002) and by complexity theory (Anderson, 1999; Lucas, 2004; 2005) add to 
understanding relationships and consequences within systems while other developments, 
including prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), facilitate appreciation of what is 
being sought, behaviour, and how evaluations operate. 
 
Drach-Zahavy and Somech (2010) confirm that boundaries are established to separate teams 
(in-groups) from others such that in-group activities (and management) may be facilitated by 
some degree of independence (isolation).  However,  “…because teams cannot internally 
generate all needed resources, they must engage in boundary activity to protect themselves as 
well as to acquire resources critical for their survival…” (ibid: 146).  Thus, they posit four 
boundary activities: buffering – separating the in-group and preserving its resources; 
bringing-up borders (boundaries) – melding members into a coherent team; scouting – 
scanning and securing resources from the environment; coordinating – relating to out-groups 
in the environment with which the in-group is interdependent for success.  That demonstrates 
a ‘competing forces model’ of independence (differentiation/specialisation) and 
interdependence (integration/cooperation/coordination) in which the forces strive for 
equilibrium in dynamic environments (akin to Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). 
 
Frequently, boundary management is examined in the situation of a dyadic interaction 
concerning how to deal with matters across a single interface – the resultant of the 
combination (intersection) of the two individual boundaries.  In many organisations, there are 
both intra- and inter-organisational boundaries and, although intra-organisational boundaries 
may be mitigated by over-arching common objectives etc. relating to the whole organisation, 
they are, nonetheless, important (such as differences between on-site engineers and office-
based engineers – Rooke, Seymour and Fellows, 2003).  In project TMOs, there are not only 
 
 
individual organisational goals/objectives as well as objectives of sub-groups and of 
individuals but the communicated / perceived project objectives serve, to some extent, as a 
‘common glue’ amongst participants provided they are clear, communicated, and accepted 
(bringing up borders).  The structuring of interactions and, hence, the configurations of 
boundaries / interfaces is complicated but such complications are mitigated by commitment 
to common goals – as an essential for teamwork. 
 
Following systems theory (‘hard’ – Cleland and King, 1983; and ‘soft’ – Green and Simister, 
1999), major features of boundaries are: location (to denote the system’s content and 
activities, etc.), flexibility (to change the scope / scale), permeability (concerning ease of 
movement across the boundary), and effects (changes consequent upon movement across the 
boundary) (see also: Martin, et al., 2004).   
 
The location of any organisational boundary lies at the limits of the organisation – as defined 
legally, by its formal systems, or/and informally by its social systems, etc.; however, moving 
from formal delineation to more informal delineation leads to fuzziness in determination of 
where the limits of the organisation lie.  That is particularly the case for project activities 
which generate TMOs for project realisations whether or not formal alliances, JVs, etc. are 
employed (i.e., buffering).  Clearly, the organisation’s legal boundary is extended if the firm 
takes over another; it is also extended by entering a formal alliance or JV (flexibility), 
although differences do arise between equity and non-equity joint ventures (Glaister, Husan 
and Buckley, 1998).  However, when a construction firm undertakes a project, the location of 
the formal (legal) organisational boundary usually remains unchanged but the informal 
boundary is extended to encompass the project – at least, that organisation’s role on the 
project. 
 
 
 
A consequence of TMOs is that a multi-tier system of boundaries results – the formal 
organisations’ boundaries; the boundaries around each organisation’s activity groups 
operating on the project; the boundaries around each within-an-organisation group on the 
project; and the boundaries around informal groups which include members of different 
participating organisations.  The resultant lack of clarity of organisational boundary locations 
generates potential for overlapping with other organisations on the project also and so, 
constitutes a notable area of possible conflict (domain/jurisdiction and role conflicts).  
Otherwise, such  arrangements are considered as areas of ‘coopetition’ (Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger, 1996), collaborative competition (Kaler, 2009), or competitive collaboration 
– participants must collaborate to realise the project but do so (somewhat) competitively with 
each other in pursuit of their own goals in a zero-sum game. 
 
Permeability is demonstrated by ease of movement across a boundary.  Construction is an 
industry with very few, and low, barriers to entry or exit (Hillebrandt, 2000), although certain 
professions’ entry requirements are regulated significantly (e.g., Architects in UK; Chartered 
Engineers).  Universally, construction (industry, organisations and projects) responds rapidly 
and extensively to environmental changes (n.b., price turbulence).  Thus, the boundaries are 
highly permeable. 
 
Boundary effects concern changes which are dependent and consequent upon merely crossing 
a boundary.  In an organisational context, many such effects are behavioural – entering the 
office of the chief executive officer is likely to result in more polite, if not deferential, 
behaviour by an employee.  Such effects are situational/contingent and, to a significant extent, 
depend upon organisational cultures,climates and project/workplace atmosphere (Liu and 
 
 
Fellows, 2012).  Incompatibility of organisational cultures/climates is likely to generate 
conflict due to (innocent) inappropriate behaviour, etc. – especially if the persons involved 
are unaware of / insensitive to such differences (see, e.g., Fellows and Liu, 2008). 
 
Owen et al’s (2010) observations, above, articulate the extending complications of projects – 
which promote increasing specialisations, and interdependencies of those specialisations in 
combining to yield complete projects.  Commonly, that situation is treated in a reductionist 
way by splitting a project into manageable components (e.g. procurement system composed 
of people, processes, function mechanisms differentiated into project phases dominated by 
different teams of consultant and/or specialist contractors etc.) which are analysed 
individually and the results combined additively (e.g., Reugg and Marshall, 1990; Lawrence 
and Scanlan, 2007; RIBA, 2008).  Thus, holistic/synergistic impacts of component 
combinations are omitted (Lucas, 2005). 
 
Thompson (1967) determines three forms of interdependencies relating to tasks (or 
arrangement of work flows).  In sequential interdependency, tasks must be carried out in 
strict order (series); in reciprocal interdependency, outputs of one task are inputs for one or 
more other tasks, which may cycle iteratively (as in architectural and structural engineering 
design); in pooled interdependency, each task provides (only) a contribution to the whole and 
may do so independently (which facilitates parallel working).  Thompson (1967) raises two 
primary questions concerning task interdependencies: what causes task interdependency and 
who are task interdependent – the answers are contingent in that they are determined by 
technology and by how the work is organised.  Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig (1967) 
extend the debate by adding team interdependencies which may be analysed from both inter- 
 
 
and intra-team (in-group) perspectives.  Thus, interdependency may be regarded as a multi-
layered phenomenon comprising tasks at intra- and inter-group (team) levels. 
 
In more recent studies, inter-team task interdependence refers to the extent to which a team 
believes it is dependent on other teams in the organisation to carry out its tasks and perform 
effectively (Hulsheger, Anderson and Salgado, 2009).  The emerging research on inter-team 
networking typically emphasises the beneficial role of creating linkages with other teams (Oh, 
Labianca and Chung, 2006; Tuuli, Rowlinson, Fellows and Liu, forthcoming).  In any case, 
boundary activities should refer to all the interdependent activities that teams engage in to 
manage their boundaries by relating to external people and objects (Yan and Louis, 1999; 
Drach-Zahavy and Somech, 2010). 
 
The emergence of team-based project organisations may require shifting the focus from intra-
team to inter-team activities in order to understand organisational functioning.  According to 
Drach-Zahavy and Somech (2010), inter-team boundary activity is contingent on inter-team 
goal and task interdependence, while team heterogeneity, inter-team power relations, 
organisational culture (individualism-collectivism), and favourable external environment are 
important moderators of the relationships between inter-team interdependence configuration, 
boundary activity, team performance, and organisational performance.  A social identity 
perspective (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Brewer, 1996, Hogg, 2000) and interactionism 
(Mischel, 1977) provide the basis for Drach-Zahavy and Somech’s (2010:146-148) model  in 
which (1) boundary activities are defined as “team processes necessary to carry out the task at 
hand that are directed toward external agents in a team’s focal environment to gain resources 
and promote and protect itself” (see also Ancona and Caldwell, 1992, Yan and Louis, 1999); 
(2) external activities are referred to as “interactions aimed outside the team boundary” and 
 
 
internal activities are defined as “intra-team processes occurring within the team boundary, 
such as forming and enforcing team norms, communication among members, use of internal 
resources and creation of a shared team vision” (see also Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Choi, 
2002) – forming, storming, and norming (Tuckman, 1965) – ; and (3) external team 
networking is defined as “those interactions aimed outside the team boundary and directly 
related to team performance” (see also Joshi, 2006).  
 
Importantly, Drach-Zahavy and Somech (2010) conclude that boundary activity determines 
whether higher team performance can fully translate into higher organisational performance 
(in terms of team functioning in the context of interdependent relations with other 
organisational teams). 
 
Boundary Spanning 
In the face of global competition, changing economic conditions and increased project (tasks) 
complexity, there is a greater need for project (organisational) teams to coordinate 
interdependent work efforts and bridge disconnected teams by managing relationships 
external to themselves.  The team’s efforts to establish and manage external linkages (team 
boundary spanning – scouting and coodinating) can occur within an organisation and/or 
across organisational boundaries.  Through team boundary spanning behaviours, teams bridge 
diverse and disconnected parties and act as critical channels for information transfer and 
innovation (e.g., Argote, McEvity and Reagans, 2003; Hargadon, 1998) – which underpins 
knowledge sharing and social networking. 
 
Boundary spanning, acting across one or more boundaries, is undertaken by persons 
appointed specifically to do so (designated boundary spanners) as well as by many others 
 
 
doing so informally; often, boundary spanning is analysed and depicted using social network 
analysis (Di Marco, Taylor and Alin, 2010).  Boundary spanning occurs extensively between 
sub-units within a single organisation as well as between separate organisations in dyadic and 
more extensive relationship patterns, including making representations to stakeholders, 
coordination with other (out-) groups and seeking information from external bodies (Ancona 
and Caldwell, 1992); such activities are important for performance (Gladstein, 1984) and for 
innovation (Hargadon, 1998). 
 
Boundary spanning involves bridging – finding and connecting with external organisations 
which the boundary spanner perceives as being of value – and, then, bonding to build 
relationships with those external organisations; similar activities occur to foster internal 
relationships between sub-units within an organisation.  Thus, boundary spanning acts to 
extend and enhance the social capital of the in-group and the organisation and, thereby, foster 
reciprocity and trust, as well as extending the informal boundary of the organisation (in-
group).  However, social capital may also comprise norms of conformity and compliance and, 
further, may engender stronger boundaries around the in-group which, in consequence, limits 
external communication and so, is detrimental to creativity and innovation through the 
reduction of novel stimuli (see, e.g., Edelman et al., 2004).  Demarcation and differentiation 
of in-group and out-groups is accentuated in collectivist societies (Gomez, Kirkman and 
Shapiro, 2000) thereby necessitating greater effort for boundary spanning. 
 
Marrone (2010) notes that team boundary spanning captures the interactions across the team 
boundary to parties in the embedding environment such as clients, customers, industry 
experts, and other mutually interdependent teams.  Because of the diversity of information 
obtained through boundary spanning, opportunities arise to negotiate project expectations and 
 
 
requirements betweens mutually interdependent parties.  A particular activity is reconciliation 
of diverse goals/objectives of stakeholders to yield a coherent and accepted set to apply to the 
project.  Notably, for external cooperation to work well, the organisation must have good 
internal cooperation (Hillebrand, 1996) and, to maximise potential benefits, must operate as a 
learning organisation.  (Management and technology transfer (learning) often is an important 
objective of the host developing country in international JV projects.) 
 
Boundary spanning between different communities of knowledge and of practice involves 
issues of comprehension and translation between the communities to ensure clarity of 
meaning (and purpose); such issues are exacerbated internationally with overlays of different 
languages and cultures.  Traditionally, in construction, a primary boundary spanning role is 
allocated to  the engineer on engineering construction or to the architect on building 
construction projects; the particular role (discipline / profession) of project manager, in-house 
/ consultant, is emerging for overall management of projects – notably, the boundary 
spanning requirements. 
 
In engineering construction projects, recognition of mutual interdependence for performance 
(and, often, workload) through complimentarity of expertise and skills encourages alignment 
of participants’ goals pertaining to (their activities on) the project.  For major projects, 
considerations of physical, financial and risk-bearing capacity engender horizontally-
configured alliances for spreading and sharing burdens and rewards.  However, it is not only 
goals which must be aligned; there are concerns for appropriate reward allocation and for 
process compatibilities through sensitivity, tolerance and accommodation, of differing 
cultures – both organisational and the national cultures in which they are embedded – as 
 
 
manifested in behavious, languages, rituals, etc. (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede and 
Minkov, 2010). 
 
Boundary spanning-in-practice (those who perform boundary spanning – who may, or may 
not have been so designated) requires that the person(s) becomes legitimate (hence, accepted) 
in the groups concerned; that may mean that they are fairly peripheral for the specialist 
activities in each (in-)group but their ability to negotiate relationships between the 
communities of practice involved is the essence of their role (Levina and Vaast, 2005).  Thus, 
the ‘primary task’ of boundary spanning is enabling and enhancing flows across boundaries 
between communities of (differing) knowledge/practice (and interests) – thereby increasing 
the permeability of those boundaries, reducing boundary effects, and rendering informal 
boundaries greater flexibility. 
 
Boundary objects 
It is not only individuals who are involved with boundary spanning but so are various 
‘objects’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989)  – which constitute the tools of boundary spanning.  
Oswick and Robertson (2009) note that boundary objects have both performative roles 
(indicating what is required – drawing; when – programme; at what quality – specification; 
and for what price - quotation / priced bill of quantities) and mediating roles (communicating 
and discursive aspects to aid determination of the final, hopefully jointly developed and 
agreed, object, e.g., issued design drawings).  They note that the mediating roles may operate 
positively “…as bridges and anchors easing knowledge transformation, change and 
innovation…” (p 189) but, in other contexts, they may operate negatively “…perceived as 
generating confusion (mazes) or worse, constraining change and innovation” (p 189). 
 
 
 
Carlile (2002) proposes a typology of boundary objects according to a typology of boundaries 
of knowledge: repositories (syntactic boundaries requiring common language for 
communication); standardised forms and methods (semantic boundaries requiring 
understanding of meaning); and objects, models and maps (pragmatic boundaries 
necessitating accommodation of diverse goals and interests). 
 
Syntactic differences in knowledge required for tasks which are separated by (organisational) 
boundaries are likely to involve differences in the types of knowledge (such as a design 
engineer and a clerk of works).  Semantic concerns relate to differences in interpretations 
(understandings / meanings e.g., terms of a contract) which may be of degree and/or kind and 
of particular import regarding differences in tacit knowledge.  The pragmatic boundaries are 
likely to be the most difficult to overcome as to do so requires new practices to be adopted 
and people prefer the status quo.   
 
There are change (switching) costs in adaptations – involving acquiring new knowledge, 
validating its applicability, and, if judged suitable, incorporating it into a new knowledge 
(practice) package; where tacit knowledge is concerned, the process is compounded and is 
likely to require physical demonstrations of the task executions involved.  Further, if 
knowledge in one field must be translated into a common language for transmission to and 
comprehension in another field, in which the knowledge (information) may be translated 
again, there is a significant possibility of information degradation or loss (Grant, 1996), hence 
the necessity to ensure the appropriate level of express content of the common language – a 
particular concern for societies which use high context languages. 
 
 
 
Thus, Carlile (2002) asserts the three characteristics of effective boundary objects to be “...a 
shared syntax or language for individuals to represent their knowledge...” (p 451); “...a 
concrete means for individuals to specify and learn about their differences and 
dependencies…” (p 452) and “...facilitates a process where individuals can jointly transform 
their knowledge” (p 452).  The first two facets constitute practical aspects while the third is 
political.  The political facet is important as boundary objects impact on social relations, 
including status (Bechky, 2003a). 
 
Particular features of boundary objects are that they are susceptible to differing 
interpretations (plastic) such that they can be understood and used for individual needs – and, 
thereby, promote interaction, debate and inquiry by diverse communities of practice.  Often, 
those communities of practice access and use boundary objects interdependently on projects 
and so, those objects must be sufficiently robust to maintain their identity (recognisable 
structure and data / information content despite different comprehension and use contexts – 
see Lawrence and Scanlan (2007) for a discussion of programming techniques and autoCAD 
on engineering projects including their role as boundary objects).  Protocols for access to and 
limits of use of boundary objects – as in BIM – are important, control-based reinforcements 
of plasticity and robustness on engineering construction projects (e.g., architectural and 
engineering design inputs). 
 
The balance between plasticity and robustness is essential to the effects which boundary 
objects may have.  Over-extensive plasticity can render boundary objects too vague in 
meaning and so, too open to vastly differing interpretations – thereby, potentially, causing 
frustration as interpretations are too disparate to engender meaningful discussion.  
Insufficient plasticity renders the boundary objects too rigid – thereby, reinforcing differences 
 
 
and barriers and so, fostering independent perspectives and conflicts.  Thus, “The critical 
feature [of boundary objects] is that they act as common information spaces that enable 
interaction and coordination without consensus or shared goals” (Bartel and Garud, 2003: 
333); [ ] added.  Hence, boundary objects are essential to the functioning of construction 
project TMOs, given their multi-objective coalition nature. 
 
“…boundary objects’ characteristics and performances are embedded in the situated practices 
of the agents who use them” (Levinia and Vaast, 2005: 340).  They advocate differentiating 
between “designated boundary objects and boundary objects-in-use” (p 340).  Boundary 
objects-in-use are artifacts which are “…locally useful (i.e., be meaningfully and usefully 
incorporated into practices of diverse fields) and must have a common identity across fields” 
(p 341).  Thus, boundary objects are representations of knowledge/practice of a community 
which are used by one or more other communities; the more useful those boundary objects 
are to the other communities, the more effective and efficient they are. 
 
In many (project) instances there is a multiplicity of boundary objects-in-use which, 
commonly, associate to form ‘boundary infrastructures’ (networks of boundary objects e.g., 
contract documents) (Bowker and Star, 1999).  A common situation is for omissions, 
discrepancies and divergencies to occur between boundary objects’ (e.g., drawings) contents 
which, for efficient and effective progress, require early detection and resolution.  Early 
detection should be promoted through use of CAD and BIM systems amongst designers, 
constructors and project users, provided the system is shared and access is adequate but also 
that the ability to amend contents is appropriately constrained (see Lawrence and Scanlan, 
2007; Day, 1996).   
 
 
 
Complexity and project governance 
 
Modern engineering construction increasingly comprises complex projects with multi-
stakeholders (Hobday, 1998; Miller and Lessard, 2000; Miller and Hobbs, 2002).  
Complexity concerns the individual and combinations of technology employed to realise a 
project and to operate the project in use, as well as the organisations and their assembly on 
the project.  Williams (1999) categorises project complexity as structural (concerning 
differentiation: the number of elements, division of tasks, etc.; and interdependency: inter-
relatedness/connectivity of the elements) and uncertainty (regarding goals and methods).  Not 
only are engineering products and their realisation processes complex but so is the 
performance package of the project-in-use as required by the client (Caldwell, et al., 2009). 
 
Complex adaptive systems (organisations) are characterised by four key elements: (1) agents 
with schemata, (2) self-organising networks sustained by importing energy, (3) coevolution 
to the edge of chaos and (4) system evolution based on recombination (Anderson, 1999).  For 
engineering construction projects, the four elements indicate:  agents with boundary spanning 
behaviours organise themselves to locate and import resources necessary for utilisation on the 
project in order to work with other systems in an adaptive/flexible manner; where boundary 
spanning activities/behaviours and boundary management may result in evolution of new 
system combinations.  “Strategic direction of complex organisations consists of establishing 
and modifying environments within which effective, improvised, self organised solutions can 
evolve” (Anderson, 1999:216).  A particular feature of complex systems is holism – that the 
performance of the system is not the simple, arithmetic sum of its individual components but 
synergy is very likely to operate (Anderson, 1999; Lucas, 2005; Bertelsen and Emmitt, 2005). 
 
 
 
Not only do complex projects involve many boundaries around different technologies and 
organisations, which occur at various levels and differ in nature, but the interdependencies 
and feedback / feedforward components emphasise the importance of managing across those 
boundaries.  Concerns of such boundary management are likely to be exacerbated as the 
goals of stakeholders emerge throughout the realisation of the project (and, often, beyond) 
(Thomson, 2011) and the systems themselves co-evolve and self-organise – thereby changing 
the locations and natures of informal, if not formal, boundaries over the project duration.  
Hence, it is postulated, that boundary management must be flexible and adaptive (responsive, 
at least) rather than a rigid ‘command and control’ approach (see discussion of governance, 
below). 
 
Project Organisations as Complex Systems 
A complex system is one made up of a large number of parts that have many interactions 
(Simon, 1996).  Thompson (1967) describes a complex organisation as a set of 
interdependent parts which, together make up a whole that is interdependent with some larger 
environment. Daft (1992) equates complexity with the number of activities or subsystems 
within the organisation, noting that it can be measured along three dimensions.  Vertical 
complexity is the number of levels in an organisational hierarchy, horizontal complexity is 
the number of job titles/departments, and spatial complexity is the number of geographical 
locations.  Given the temporal changes in construction TMOs (participants and their 
agents/representatives), it is appropriate to propose that, especially for major engineering 
construction projects, a dimension of temporal complexity be added to Daft’s typology.  
Those dimensions of complexity correspond to the dimensions of fragmentation, above; as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 about HERE 
 
Since organisations are, often, enormously complex (Daft and Lewin 1990), the behaviour of 
complex systems is hard to predict and may be surprising – because it is nonlinear (Casti, 
1994).  In nonlinear systems, intervening to change initial conditions and/or one or two 
parameters a small amount can drastically change the behaviour of the whole system 
(Anderson, 1999).  However, modern complexity theory suggests that some systems with 
highly differentiated parts can produce surprisingly simple, predictable behaviour, while 
others which feature simple laws and few actors may generate behaviour that is impossible to 
forecast.  While chaos theory demonstrates that simple laws can have complicated, 
unpredictable consequences, complexity theory describes how complex causes can produce 
simple effects (Cohen and Stewart, 1994). 
 
Six important insights of Anderson (1999: 217) give a good overview of complexity theory: 
(1) “many dynamical systems do not reach either a fixed point or a cyclical equilibrium”; (2) 
“processes that appear to be random may be chaotic, revolving around identifiable types of 
attractors in a deterministic way that seldom if ever return to the same state”; (3) “the 
behaviour of complex processes can be quite sensitive to small differences in initial 
conditions, so that two entities with very similar initial states can follow radically divergent 
paths over time” (an important consideration for project performance prediction and control 
endeavours); (4) “complex systems resist simple reductionist analyses, because 
interconnections and feedback loops preclude holding some subsystems constant in order to 
study others in isolation” – because descriptions at multiple scales are necessary to identify 
how emergent properties are produced (Bar-Yam 1997), reductionism and holism are 
complementary strategies in analysing such systems (Fontana and Ballati 1999); (5) 
 
 
“complex patterns can arise from the interaction of agents that follow relatively simple rules”, 
(6) “complex systems tend to exhibit self organising behaviours: starting in a random state, 
they usually evolve toward order instead of disorder” (see also: discussion of evolving project 
governance, below). 
 
Complex adaptive systems theories presume that the adaptation of a system emerges from the 
efforts of individual agents who attempt to improve their own payoffs, but that the 
individuals’ payoffs depend on the choices that other agents make also – typically the case on 
engineering construction projects involving multi-stakeholders.  Hence, agents (project 
participant organisations and their representatives) coevolve with one another where local 
adaptations lead to the formation of continually evolving niches/coalitions (Anderson, 1999) 
which means that the complex systems do not operate at equilibrium of globally optimal 
system performance – i.e., value conflicts are resolved as compromises amongst the multi-
stakeholders (through satisficing – Simon, 1996).  Morel and Ramanujam (1999) argue that 
such apparent disequilibrium is actually a dynamic equilibrium.  Hence, boundary spanning is 
critical (to the system equilibrium) as the agents (and other resources) shift/manoeuvre 
activities and behaviours to maintain the equilibrium with other coevolving systems 
(balancing the needs/goals of multi-stakeholders both within and external to the project 
TMO).  Thus, Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) and Weick (1979) argue that organisations can 
continue to exist only if they maintain a balance between flexibility and stability (analogous 
to the balancing of plasticity and robustness of boundary objects).  Additionally, they contend 
that the strategic equilibrium over time for an organisation is a combination of frequent small 
changes made in an improvisational way (e.g., evolving use of subcontractors) that 
occasionally cumulate into radical strategic innovations, changing the terms of competition 
fundamentally (e.g., imposition/adoption of PFI). 
 
 
 
Simon (1996) points out that any adaptive entity contains an adaptive inner environment and 
that complex adaptive systems are nested hierarchies which contain other complex adaptive 
systems.  More importantly, every aspect of a complex adaptive system (agents, their 
schemata, the nature and strength of connections between them, and their fitness functions) 
can change over time, i.e. new systems may appear, old systems may become extinct, and 
existing ones may survive in a fundamentally new form.  Hence, a complex engineering 
project is an adaptive entity containing an adaptive inner project environment with its own 
nested hierarchies of complex systems of participant organisations and an external project 
environment with complex stakeholder network systems.  It is at the boundaries of the 
systems where management of agents, objects and spanning activities occur to maintain the 
adaptiveness and flexibility of the systems to achieve dynamic equilibrium in order to yield 
the desired outcome for complex engineering construction project procurement – i.e., 
flexibility in the process (system) enhances robustness of outcome achievement. 
 
Boundary management is, therefore, very important for complex engineering project delivery 
where networks of firms deal with a myriad of task, specialisation, resource, and other 
boundaries in the execution of complex (and, often, interdependent) projects. 
 
Project Governance and Control 
Governance is “The action or manner of governing….Controlling, directing or regulating 
influence; control, sway, mastery” (OED, 2011).  Samset, Berg and Klakegg (2006) note the 
OECD’s six principles of good governance – accountability, transparency, efficiency and 
effectiveness, responsiveness, forward vision, and rule of law.  Turner (2006: 93) suggests 
that “Project governance provides the structure through which the objectives of the project 
 
 
are set, and the means of obtaining those objectives are determined, and the means of 
monitoring performance are determined….Project governance involves a set of relationships 
between a project’s management, its sponsor, its owner, and other stakeholders”.  Clearly, the 
essentials are determining objectives and ensuring that organisational processes and resources 
are employed to maximise the potential for their effective and efficient pursuit – through 
determining and achieving, if not surpassing, performance targets.  However, much control is 
illusory – many persons believe that they are able to control much more than is the actual 
case (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). 
 
The multiplicity of technologies, stakeholders, etc. indicates the very large number of 
boundaries on engineering construction projects and, thence, the difficulty of identifying 
objectives, determining their relative importances for the project, securing commitment to 
them, and developing and implementing appropriate structures and processes amongst the 
diverse multi-participants which have to be addressed in governance of such projects.  Those 
boundaries, in accordance with Turner’s definition, are both internal to organisations and the 
project, and external; their management, notably, boundary spanning, is underpinning of the 
relationships experienced.  The formal governance provides the framework – organisational 
model, contractual rights, duties, procedures, etc. – whilst the operation of the informal 
system within (sometimes, in spite of) that framework provides the de facto governance. 
 
Perspectives on governance of organisations and of projects has moved from command and 
control, to transaction costs and agency, to co-evolution and self-organising (key components 
of complexity theory) (see, e.g., Ruuska, Ahola, Artto, Lacotelli and Mancini, 2011; Winch, 
2001; Miller and Hobbs, 2005; Miller and Lessard, 2008; Klakegg, 2009).  Winch (2001) 
notes the importance of trust for project governance, especially under high uncertainty; in 
 
 
project circumstances, the level and type of trust (and perceived trustworthiness) is likely to 
be a function of boundary management and the boundary spanners-in-practice.  Winch notes 
the impact of professional institutions on governance – really supplementing trust with 
assurances – which may be extended to the array of social institutions in which the project is 
embedded and to which the boundary spanners relate (see, e.g.,Hagen and Choe, 1998; 
Bachmann, 2001). 
 
Ruuska et al. (2011) suggest seven key operational elements of governance of large, complex 
engineering construction projects – contract, organisation and execution of procurement, 
management of networks of suppliers, risk allocation and management, work coordination 
and monitoring, practices and collaboration amongst participants, and communications.  That 
mix of formal and informal governance elements concerns boundary management intimately, 
indicating the roles of boundary spanners-in-practice for project governance (the 
informal/social elements supplementing and reinforcing the formal elements noted in the 
contract documents). 
 
Flyvbjerg (2009), from analysis of 258 major engineering construction projects (mostly 
infrastructure), argues that accountability, as a primary principle of governance, is achieved 
in the public sector through “…transparency and control…” and in the private sector through 
“…competition and market mechanism…” (p359).  A continuing theme in Flyvbjerg’s 
research is the advocacy of the ‘outside view’, notably, comprising ‘reference class 
forecasting’ (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006) and criticism of political and 
internal forecasting mechanisms which incentivise fallacious predictions of outcomes to 
secure authorisation of projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002).  That may be attributable to project 
boundaries being sufficiently impermeable to isolate the project from informed external 
 
 
scrutiny (inadequate transparency) and so, reflect a breakdown/detriment in boundary 
management. 
 
In effecting governance of projects, Turner and Keegan (2001) determine two key functional 
roles – broker (for external liaison) and steward (for internal management of the project).  
However, they note the fuzzing of roles in engineering construction where a ‘project director’ 
deals directly with the client, following establishment of contact by the marketing department, 
and executes oversight management of the project with a line management network of 
subordinates.  With repeat orders and only a small number of firms able to undertake large, 
specialist engineering construction projects – commonly, as ologopolosts (Hobday, 1998), the 
functions of broker diminish (to maintaining good, or, at least, reasonable relationships – 
which, along with reputation, depend on performance on projects) and so, the emphasis vests 
in stewardship due to interdependencies and complexities of project realisation activities.  
Thus, the role of project director becomes oriented to optimising overall project realisation 
performance, with responsibility for activities, and their detailed coordination, delegated 
down the managerial hierarchy. 
 
Brezilius, Flyvbjerg and Rothengatter (2002: 147) assert that “…if all groups which feel 
concerned are included in the project development process…at an early stage, the chances 
would become better that those conditions which people view as important to making a 
decision would be taken into account”.  That stresses the external, broker role of boundary 
spanners to identify both the stakeholders and their requirements early, due to the important, 
prevailing impact of early decisions (such as selection of the procurement ‘route’) but, most 
importantly, to ensure that the performance forecasts – and, hence, expectations – are realistic. 
 
 
 
Recent research on project governance stresses the need for “…a flexible strategic process…” 
(Miller and Hobbs, 2005: 47) in which governance structure adapts/evolves in response to 
changes in the project environment, emergence of unforeseen events, and requirements of the 
different stages in project realisation (Miller and Hobbs, 2005; Ruuska et al., 2011; Samset et 
al., 2006).  In practice, formal systems tend to be fixed for a project’s duration but the 
informal systems are much more flexible and do evolve.  That requires the boundary 
managers to be adaptive to maintain the integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency of both the 
total system and its constituents, and a formal governance regime which allows the practices 
of governance to evolve within the over-arching regulatory framework. 
 
Discussion – current practices and future potential 
 
Current practices 
Engineering construction projects may be caricatured as joint ventures (due to 
interdependencies), commonly involving many different participants in their various life 
cycle phases.  An important question is ‘to what extent does each participant recognise that, 
although their objectives are realised through their own performance on the project that 
performance is dependent on the performance of other participants also’?  Recognition of 
interdependence moves participants towards cooperation and collaboration which also 
mitigates the consequences of boundaries.  Thus, one important task of (project) management 
is to determine the commonalities and compatibilities of stakeholders’ goals/objectives and 
ensure that they are articulated and communicated, preferably, agreed and accepted, with a 
view to securing higher levels of commitment and, consequently, performance (see, Nicolini, 
2002; Dainty, Bryman, Price, Greasley, Soetanto and King, 2005). 
 
 
 
Thus, management of boundaries requires awareness of own goals/objectives and of the 
goals/objectives of the other parties; in the cases of projects, that includes awareness of 
expressed / agreed objectives for the project.  Usually, others’ objectives but also, all too 
often, project objectives and the objectives of own organisation are either unexpressed or 
expressed in such vague generalisations (common in corporate ‘mission statements’) that 
significant assumptions must be made to render them operational.  Notably, assumptions are 
not always correct!  The objectives are used to decide actions and so, behaviour and, thence, 
impact on performance and outcomes for stakeholders; hence, operational clarity is essential. 
 
Levinia and Vaast (2005) articulate the functional relationship between boundary spanners-
in-practice and boundary objects-in-use.  Boundary spanners-in-practice: 
(a) “reflect on objects from each field and reflect on their utility within the context of the 
new joint field” (p 354) 
(b) “create new artifacts (or adopt existing ones) and attempt to establish their new 
identity within the new joint field” (p 354) 
(c) “use various species of capital to establish the local usefulness and symbolic value of 
the artifacts they are promoting as boundary objects” (p 355) 
(d) use emerging boundary objects-in-practice “to signify their position in the new joint 
field and the position of their field vis-à-vis others” (p 355). 
 
There is a small amount of emerging evidence that use of procurement routes which foster 
integration of designers, and of designers with constructors, leads to projects with improved 
project management performance (time and cost) (Vasters, Prins and Koppels, 2010; 
Constructing Excellence, 2007).  [Note that Vasters et al. findings are tentative and that in 
 
 
respect of ‘demonstrator projects’, the outcomes may be somewhat questionable due to the 
likelihood of elements of ‘self fulfilling prophesies’ being present.] 
 
Engineering construction projects are labour intensive; the organisations which carry out 
those projects are appropriately regarded as social collectivities which draw on individual and 
social expertise (knowledge and skills) to produce goods and services (see, Kogut and Zander, 
1992).  Given the multiplicity of expertise required for engineering construction projects and 
the diversity of organisations within which the expertise resides, there are significant 
differences in professional values and allegiancies which are difficult to integrate, especially 
within TMOs and with the presence of different professional dialects (if not different 
languages).  Thus, boundary spanners, and the boundary objects which they assist to generate 
and use, are vital for communication and coordination.  Higher order considerations, notably, 
trust and commitment, operate to foster development of a common language and processes 
amongst participants, all of which are enhanced through long-term relationships, adhering to 
the theory of familiarity (Aldrich, 1971; Das and Teng, 1998).  Unfortunately, such 
developments are severely restricted through the lack of continuity of employment of 
organisations and personnel over series of projects (programmes). 
 
In engineering construction projects, a large array of diverse boundary objects is used – many 
at multiple stages and for multiple purposes (briefing documents, value management reports, 
contracts, drawings, specifications, product guarantees, etc.).  The separation (fragmentation) 
of the various disciplines and organisations which use such objects is extensive and widely 
documented (see, above) and the interpretive variability gives rise to conflicts, disputes and 
claims.  Whether such problems arise due to vagueness in the boundary objects themselves, 
the paucity of boundary spanning to foster cooperation and commitment due to goal conflicts 
 
 
between participants, effects of work allocation systems (which operate as zero-sum games), 
the level of risks which must be assumed compared with the level of returns, or combinations 
of those constructs is contested. 
 
In realisations of construction projects, CAD programs are becoming increasingly extended 
in scope and, through 3-D and 4-D versions, as in BIM, greatly assist boundary spanning 
through visualisation and appreciation of components, processes and their consequences – 
such as safety issues during construction, adaptation and disposal.  Such boundary objects are 
also used to help maintenance provisions and processes and help to foster designers’ and 
future occupiers’ understanding of how the completed project is likely to work.  Thus, those 
boundary objects demonstrate success as common information spaces used by project 
participants who, thereby, interact and coordinate their activities whilst maintaining their own 
goals (see Bartel and Garud, 2003, above). 
 
However, in many engineering project contexts, extensive proportions of design and 
manufacturing are subcontracted (80% for some aircraft projects; Lawrence and Scanlan, 
2007).  Such diverse and widely (spatially) distributed teams, each of which contributes to a 
common, central virtual model, give rise to significant risk of input errors becoming 
incorporated and distributed to others as only (very) few persons may be empowered and 
have adequate knowledge to scrutinise the total model; simple errors (clashes) may be 
detected automatically by ‘failsafe’ devices but other, less obvious and, potentially, very 
serious errors may be very difficult to detect early. 
 
Human / organisational perceptions of other participants, their objectives and anticipated 
behaviour (which depend on experiences, reputations and own disposition towards trust, 
 
 
competition, etc.) are likely to impact on the contents of and access to (certain) boundary 
objects in order to contain/constrain or to communicate / share information and knowledge.  
Although trust and distrust are commonly viewed as opposite ends of a single dimension, that 
perception may not be appropriate (Lewicki et al., 1998).  Given that many business relations 
are multi-faceted, and trust may be regarded as arising out of one or a combination of causal 
factors (own disposition, reputation of the other(s), and own experience of the other(s)), 
“…relationship partners might trust each other in certain aspects, not trust each other in other 
respects, and even distrust each other at times.” (ibid 450).  The outcome suggests the 
contingent natures of relationships and, thence, of boundary management and its 
consequences.  There are quite likely to be differing outcomes from combinations of 
boundary activities for the various in-groups and for the organisations (temporary – as 
TMOs/quasi firms; and permanent – firms) in which they are embedded. 
 
Trust and power, in the context of participants’ objectives, and social and legal norms and 
constraints, are important concerns for the development of boundary objects and how they are 
perceived and used.  Bechky (2003b), through examination of engineering drawings, etc. as 
boundary objects, notes their development by engineers and managers but their use in 
production by operatives, and others, in situations of contested goals and power differentials, 
thereby giving rise to dissonance between intentions and actual uses leading to re-work, 
claims, and a control requirement (all of which are detrimental to performance).  Bachmann’s 
(2001) view that trust and power are means of social control within business relationships is 
revealing, especially in the light of Korczynski (2000: 178), who finds that for most 
relationships “In situations of power imbalance there is a temptation to enforce cooperation 
through power rather than trust” – as is frequently the case in engineering construction 
 
 
projects.  Those issues are important for determination of appropriate systems of project 
governance, both formal and informal (see: Ouchi, 1979; Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). 
 
Even within the overlay of partnering procurement to encourage cooperation between parties 
on construction projects (see Bresnen and Marshall 2000a; 2000b; Bresnen 2010), boundaries 
remain distinct between organisations due to differing interests and perspectives.  That 
suggests insufficient awareness of mutual interdependencies to motivate collaboration, 
despite the formal contracts and the particular partnering processes adopted (n.b., partnering 
workshops and the production of partnering charters as contract documents).  Thus, the 
differences are highly ingrained and Bresnen (2010: 625) demonstrates “…the difficulty of 
using designated boundary objects as mechanisms to achieve integration where practice is 
highly decentralised, diffused and distributed (Sapsed and Salter, 2004)” and thus, 
emphasises the importance of boundary spanners’ skills in developing and fostering human 
relationships. 
 
Attention to partnering and other relational considerations (e.g., relational contracting, 
including attention to covenantal relationships) lie along a purposive spectrum of rationale 
from impacting on performance to impacting on the social relationships (primarily, in the 
project workplace).  The perspective adopted seemingly reflects (degrees of) 
positivism/functionalism and interpretivism/social constructivism epistemologies, in 
alignment with being and becoming ontologies (discussed by Winter, Smith, Morris and 
Cicmil, 2006 regarding projects).  Whether the goal of improving relationships is to effect 
improvements in project (realisation) performance or to improve relationships as a social 
‘good’, it still places onus on boundary management to foster commitment, collaboration, 
attachment, and harmony and to prevent negative conflict, etc.  Hence, projects are seen as 
 
 
media in which boundary management can secure greater meaning, sense of worth and 
achievement (self actualisation – Maslow, 1954). 
 
Boundary management may be regarded as safeguarding self and own interests while 
endeavouring to overcome the boundary in order to gain from others.  However, in more 
collaborative / altruistic climates, the endeavours to overcome the boundary are to foster 
collective / mutual gain through pooling and sharing of resources and outcomes (‘win-win’ 
outcomes as non-zero-sum games). In the context of international joint ventures (IJVs) those 
who manage across boundaries, ‘boundary spanners’, “…are ‘judges’ of procedural fairness, 
‘gatekeepers’ of inflows…and ‘representatives’ of outflows…” (Luo, 2009: 393). 
 
Implications for Engineering Construction Future Potential: Suggested Research Agenda 
Team boundary management is a significant contributor to team performance outcomes, 
including team innovation, efficiency and goal achievement (Marrone, 2010).  These benefits 
appear to exist across team types, such as development teams, production/service teams and 
action teams.  That observation generates a working proposition that, by operating through 
the informal system, boundary management impacts on performance irrespective of the 
formal structuring or project organisation.  Analogous to safety, boundary management 
reduces performance-impairing hazards (of negative conflict, opportunistic behaviour, etc.) 
and so, its effectiveness may be assessed through metrics of effects which affect performance 
detrimentally (e.g., disputes, claims, accidents).  Hence, boundary management is likely to 
contribute to project and organisational performance amongst stakeholders. 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that it is neither the organisational structuring of engineering 
construction projects as hierarchies, markets, or hybrids, nor the degree of overlapping  of 
 
 
activities (as in several procurement practices) but good management of boundaries which 
yields cooperation and collaboration (internal commitment to in-group plus external 
commitment to ‘project’) and so, distinguishes the levels or performance of projects and 
project management which are achieved. 
 
Thus, in educating and training engineering construction project managers (and hence, for 
future practice), recognising projects as complex adaptive systems directs emphasis to raising 
awareness of, and sensitivity to, the emergent performance requirements and parameters of 
the many, diverse participants and stakeholders – due to their differing values, cultures, 
practices, languages, knowledge, etc. and the dynamic natures of equilibria.  Such recognition 
is the essential basic for managing across the interfaces/boundaries to appreciate the 
consequences from a ‘competing values’ perspective of ‘opportunism/self’ v ‘collaborative’ 
on one dimension, with ‘zero-sum consequences’ v non-zero-sum consequences’ on the other 
(see Figure 2).  The behavioural dimension manifests the contribution of good boundary 
management, while ‘differentiation’ – ‘integration’ (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) remains a 
structural compliment. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about HERE 
 
Several aspects regarding boundaries and their management on engineering construction 
projects raise important questions for the future and, hence, for research: 
1. If firms are a repositories of technical knowledge and of capabilities, as determined by 
the social knowledge embedded in enduring individual relationships structured by 
organising principles, how are team boundaries defined and how can team boundaries 
 
 
be spanned most effectively and efficiently (both within and between project TMOs 
and the associated permanent organisations)? 
2. How do teams allocate resources across boundary activities and do teams that focus 
externally achieve higher performance than teams that focus internally? 
3. Do adverse external conditions (e.g. uncertainty) necessitate a greater need for 
boundary spanning, and how? 
4. How do network structures assist/hinder the impact of team boundary spanning 
activities, internal team functioning, and performance? 
5. How does the use of virtual tools (e.g., autoCAD in design of engineering 
construction projects) affect engagement in boundary spanning activities, including 
the frequency, quality, effectiveness and efficiency of internal and external 
communications (especially if actors are widely dispersed spatially and culturally)?  
6. How are virtual tools used in the generation and use of boundary objects, and with 
what consequences? 
7. How does the passage of time serve to enhance/hinder bounding spanning efforts (e.g. 
task coordination actions), especially knowledge capturing in TMOs and in permanent 
organisations, and its transfer between projects (n.b., impacts on organisational 
learning)? 
8. How do the structural elements (n.b. size, diversity, and interdependence) in the 
project TMO affect the boundary spanning – performance relationship? 
9. What formal project governance is (most) appropriate to be sufficiently robust for 
accountability whilst sufficiently plastic to accommodate (informal) emergence and 
self-organising of complex engineering construction projects? 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
Construction is a fragmented industry – horizontally, vertically, temporally, and spatially.  
Those dimensions of fragmentation apply to the complexity of the industry and its projects 
also and so, the two concepts are complimentary (as illustrated in Figure 1).  Horizontal 
fragmentation is addressed through work allocation mechanisms; the most common of which 
remains as single stage competitive bidding with the consequent issues relating to 
opportunistic behaviour which have become deeply ingrained.  Those consequences of 
horizontal fragmentation (industy) are exacerbated, if not dominated, by the effects of vertical 
fragmentation (project).  Vertical fragmentation involves more extensive differences and, 
particularly through the operation of ‘traditional’ procurement, reinforces the zero-sum game 
of price competitive work allocation.  Temporal fragmentation is extensive – as evidenced by 
the transient membership of project TMOs by both many organisations and the agents who 
represent them.  Spatial fragmentation (local – international) operates to reinforce the other 
categories of fragmentation but its effects may be mitigated somewhat through alliancing and 
other integrative governance mechanisms and boundary spanning.  Further, cultural 
differences, etc. remain significant – all of which operate to accentuate boundaries.  
Alternative procurement approaches, devised to overcome such problems (notably 
‘partnering’) have, so far, enjoyed limited ‘success’ as organisational boundaries remain 
strong, the status quo of behaviour remains that of the ‘traditional’ system, and boundary 
spanning/management is (consequentially) constrained and limited in effects. 
 
Engineering construction projects are nested hierarchies of complex adaptive systems 
involving numerous, diverse stakeholders.  Thus, performance requirements and parameters 
are emergent and the systems co-evolve; any equilibria are dynamic.  That reality is in major 
contrast to the common presumptions – that performance requirements are (largely) known 
 
 
and specified at the outset, that the process operates as per the formal governance 
mechanisms, and that both the process and the product realised can be strictly controlled.  
Incompatibilities between the presumptions and reality is instrumental in generating 
inappropriate expectations and hence, performance dissonance (, conflict, poor reputation, 
etc.).  Therefore, it seems that managed flexibility of the realisation process enhances 
robustness of the likely achievement of the project outcomes desired. 
 
Engineering construction projects are replete with boundaries between project roles, 
organisational types, group and individual functions, communities of practice, cultures etc.  
The project TMOs operate with extensive boundary infrastructures (of boundary objects) for 
many diverse purposes – all of which must balance the requirements of plasticity and 
robustness to be effective.  However, engineering construction organisations require 
permeable boundaries to enable them to scan the environment, and to obtain work, resources, 
and respond appropriately and speedily to changes.  Thus, while formal boundaries remain 
fairly fixed and rigid, informal boundaries for project TMO participants are quite flexible and 
so, facilitate organisational adaptations for performance of constituent project activities – 
notably, project governance. 
 
Boundaries commonly denote demarcations of cultures, climates, knowledge, practices, and 
resources which necessitate behavioural modifications for effective spanning and securing 
effective and coordinated contributions to projects through engendering adequate trust.  
Unfortunately, many project procurement methods and work allocation criteria remain driven 
by lowest (bid) price, which fosters individualist perspectives and opportunistic behaviour in 
the resultant zero-sum game.  Such perspectives and behaviour are detrimental to trust and 
enhance problems of boundary spanning via bridging and bonding; they also tend to suppress 
 
 
recognition of mutual interdependence and, hence, commitment and collaborative behaviour 
by participants as own (individual) goals / objectives dominate.  Such difficulties of 
individual organisations are enhanced in problematic environments, such as the financial 
‘squeezes’ consequent on the ‘credit crunch’ of 2008. 
 
A primary concern of boundary spanning is to nurture cooperation, collaboration and 
commitment through sensitivity to the diverse natures and interests of the participants and so, 
to foster identification, communication, acceptance and pursuit of common goals (see also: 
Nicolini, 2002; Dainty, et al., 2005).  That is facilitated by boundary objects which are 
representations of portions of knowledge drawn from one or more communities of practice 
(in-groups with stocks of particular knowledge and practice).  Thus, the role of boundary 
spanners concerns securing useful boundary objects and establishing easily intelligible and 
usable flows across the boundaries. 
 
Complimentarily, the presence and use of suitable boundary objects promotes interactions 
and coordination without the necessity of shared goals / objectives.  However, it is important 
that the boundary objects are sufficiently plastic whilst also being sufficiently robust; 
achieving a suitable balance is notoriously difficult.  As boundary objects may operate to 
accommodate pursuit of differing goals between groups, they are important not only in the 
context of the organisations (groups) which constitute engineering project TMOs but also 
within the permanent organisations (departments, business units, etc.) and between those 
organisations and their shareholders – particularly regarding acceptable corporate 
performance as managers pursue growth while owners seek profitability (Baumol, 1959). 
 
 
 
Thus, the management of boundaries, through boundary spanning-in-practice and boundary 
objects-in-use, offers a means for improving engineering construction project processes 
through achieving greater integration by recognition of mutual interdependencies while 
preserving independence.  However, the difficulties relating to communications and 
acceptance across boundaries of different communities of practice / knowledge must also 
address and overcome the self-interest orientation of those communities and supplant it with 
appreciation and acceptance of mutual interdependence.  That requires a gamut of changes – 
behaviour, climate and culture – requiring effort and reinforcement over the long term to be 
effective. 
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Figure 1: Dimensions of Fragmentation and Complexity 
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Figure 2: Competing Values Model of Boundary Management 
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